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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Nigel Singh petitions for review of a final order of 
removal based on his conviction, under 18 U.S.C § 152(3), 
for knowingly making a false statement under penalty of 
perjury in a bankruptcy proceeding.  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Singh’s 
conviction was an offense involving fraud or deceit in which 
the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000, and hence an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  In his 
petition, Singh argues that 18 U.S.C § 152(3) is a perjury 
offense that must meet the requirements for perjury-based 
aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(43)(S).  Singh 
further argues that, even if assessed under 8 U.S.C § 
1101(a)(43)(M)(i), he is not removable because his offense 
did not cause an actual loss exceeding $10,000.  While we 
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reject Singh’s first argument, we agree that under the unique 
facts of this case his offense did not cause an actual loss.  
Because we hold that § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) requires an actual, 
not merely intended, loss, we will grant Singh’s petition and 
vacate the order of removal. 
  
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Singh was born in Jamaica on August 23, 1959, and 
has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
since December 7, 1975.  Since that time, Singh has married a 
U.S. citizen and raised three U.S. children.  In 1997, Singh 
founded the Raeback Corporation, a construction contracting 
firm that bid on public works projects as a Minority Business 
Enterprise (MBE).  During his tenure as Raeback’s president, 
Singh was asked on several occasions by a business contact at 
a non-MBE firm, U.S. Rebar, to help U.S. Rebar secure 
government contracts.  In exchange for kickbacks, Singh 
falsely attested that Raeback was serving as a subcontractor 
on government projects when, in fact, U.S. Rebar did the 
subcontract work.  Under the scheme, billing was done in 
Raeback’s name and the general contractor paid Raeback, 
which then forwarded the payments to U.S. Rebar, less a ten 
percent kickback.  One of the government entities that funded 
these projects was the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey (“Port Authority”).  
  
In September 2005, during the course of the Port 
Authority project, Raeback filed for bankruptcy due to losses 
on another project.  Since the bankruptcy proceedings 
automatically froze Raeback’s bank accounts, Singh and his 
contact agreed on an arrangement in which the contact would 
deposit the general contractor’s checks and hold the funds for 
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Singh during Raeback’s bankruptcy.1
   
  Unbeknownst to Singh, 
however, his contact was a confidential informant for the Port 
Authority, which had begun investigating U.S. Rebar’s 
arrangement with Raeback.  Rather than holding the funds for 
Singh, therefore, the contact transferred the funds—
approximately $54,000 in total—to the Port Authority. 
When the Port Authority informed Singh of its 
investigation in 2007, Singh participated in two proffer 
sessions with law enforcement agents.  During these sessions, 
agents learned of Raeback’s bankruptcy proceeding.  Agents 
also learned that Raeback’s bankruptcy petition failed to 
disclose its revenue stream from the Port Authority project.  
Although the Port Authority did not take legal action against 
Singh, Singh was charged by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
the Eastern District of New York for one count of “fail[ing] to 
disclose all of Raeback’s accounts receivable on Raeback’s 
bankruptcy petition,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(3).  
Under § 152(3), it is a crime to “knowingly and fraudulently 
make[] a false declaration, certificate, verification, or 
statement under penalty of perjury” in relation to a 
bankruptcy proceeding.  On June 24, 2009, Singh pled guilty.  
As part of the plea agreement, Singh agreed to “restitution in 
                                              
1 As noted in the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), Singh “cashed 
$53,952.41 worth of checks through the confidential 
informant in order to hide these funds from creditors of 
Raeback.”  App. at 209.  While the PSR does not specifically 
state that Singh had the general contractor send the checks 
directly to U.S. Rebar, a copy of one of the checks confirms 
that this was, in fact, the arrangement.  See App. at 156 
(providing photocopy of $6,000 check from general 
contractor to U.S. Rebar). 
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the amount of $54,418.08,” to be paid by transferring the 
money “held by the Port Authority” to the bankruptcy trustee.  
  
At the time the plea agreement was entered, the U.S. 
Attorney believed Singh’s failure to disclose the Port 
Authority funds had caused “substantial interference with the 
administration of justice,” thus warranting a three-point 
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2).  Later, 
however, the U.S. Attorney informed the sentencing court 
that, “because the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are still 
ongoing and the bankruptcy trustee will receive the funds 
which the defendant attempted to secrete, the defendant’s 
crime will not affect the ultimate outcome of the bankruptcy 
proceedings.”  App. at 298.  The U.S. Attorney also informed 
the court that the trustee “did not expend any substantial 
additional resources as a result of the defendant’s fraud.”  
App. at 299.  Based on these discoveries, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office dropped its request for the three-point enhancement.  
Singh, meanwhile, emphasized the restitution agreement as a 
factor supporting his request for a non-incarceratory sentence. 
  
 On December 14, 2009, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced Singh 
to ten months in prison.  Although the court’s initial judgment 
did not mention restitution, an amended judgment issued on 
January 29, 2010 included a restitution order “pursuant to 
[the] plea agreement.”  The terms of the court’s restitution 
order, identical in all relevant respects to the terms Singh 
agreed to in the plea, ordered that “the $54,418.08 currently 
held by the Port [A]uthority” be transferred to the trustee.  On 
March 22, 2010, the funds were transferred to the trustee, and 
on January 19, 2011, the trustee distributed Raeback’s assets 
to its creditors.  
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 Shortly after Singh began serving his sentence, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal 
proceedings by issuing him a Notice to Appear (NTA).  In the 
NTA, the DHS charged that Singh’s § 152(3) conviction 
involved a “loss or intended loss” to a victim or victims 
exceeding $10,000 and thus made him removable as an 
aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  App. at 
343.  Under § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (hereinafter, “subparagraph 
(M)(i)”), an aggravated felony is defined as an “offense that 
involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or 
victims exceeds $10,000.”  The Immigration Judge sustained 
DHS’s charge and entered an order of removal, which the 
BIA affirmed on April 12, 2011.  In an unpublished opinion, 
the BIA ruled that a conviction under § 152(3) “categorically 
involves fraud,” as evident by our Court’s determination of 
the crime’s essential elements in United States v. Mathies, 
350 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965).  The BIA also ruled that Singh’s 
agreement to pay restitution and the sentencing court’s 
restitution order provided clear and convincing evidence that 
Singh’s offense caused a loss to the trustee exceeding 
$10,000. 
  
After the BIA issued its order, we granted Singh’s 
request for a stay so that we could consider his petition for 
review.  In granting the stay, we cited the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767 (2d Cir. 2009), 
where an intended loss exceeding $10,000 was held 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy the loss requirement 
of subparagraph (M)(i). 
  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
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Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) divests federal 
courts of jurisdiction to review orders of removal based on an 
alien’s commission of an aggravated felony, this 
“jurisdiction-stripping provision” only applies if we are 
satisfied the petitioner is, in fact, an alien who has committed 
an aggravated felony.  Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207 
(3d Cir. 2002).  Whether or not Singh committed an 
aggravated felony is a question of law which we review de 
novo.  Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2006).  
While we generally defer to the BIA’s reasonable 
interpretations of the INA, “[w]e do not defer to the BIA’s 
determination of whether a crime constitutes an aggravated 
felony.”  Henry v. Bureau of Immig. & Customs Enforcement, 
493 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2007).  We also will not affirm a 
BIA order if it cannot be sustained on the grounds upon 
which the BIA relied, unless “it is highly probable” that the 
omission or error did not affect the outcome.  Li Hua Yuan v. 
Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011). 
   
Under the INA, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  An aggravated felony under 
subparagraph (M)(i) has two distinct elements: (1) it must be 
a crime that “involves fraud or deceit,” (2) “in which the loss 
to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”   To determine 
whether a crime involves fraud or deceit, we must employ a 
“categorical approach” in which we focus on the crime’s 
statutory elements “rather than . . . the specific facts 
underlying the crime.”  Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 
1166, 1172 (2012).  By contrast, we must use a 
“circumstance-specific” approach to determine whether the 
alien’s offense involved a loss to a victim(s) exceeding 
$10,000, Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (2009); 
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Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010), 
wherein the loss must be “tethered” to the actual “offense of 
conviction,” not “acquitted or dismissed counts or general 
conduct,” Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302; Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 
456 F.3d 88, 106–08 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Fraud or Deceit Requirement 
We begin our analysis here by considering whether 
Singh was convicted of an offense that categorically involves 
fraud or deceit.  As the Supreme Court has recently made 
clear, a crime involves fraud or deceit if it “necessarily 
entail[s] fraudulent or deceitful conduct.”  Kawashima, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1172; accord Valansi, 278 F.3d at 210.  For the reasons 
that follow, we hold that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 
152(3) necessarily entails deceit and therefore qualifies as a 
deceit offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
 
To violate 18 U.S.C. § 152(3), one must “knowingly 
and fraudulently make a false declaration . . . under penalty of 
perjury” in relation to a bankruptcy proceeding.  This Court 
has previously interpreted the phrase “knowingly and 
fraudulently” in § 152(3) as requiring an intent to defraud.  In 
re Topper, 229 F.2d 691, 692 (3d Cir. 1956) (interpreting § 
152(3) as requiring “actual intent on the part of the bankrupt 
to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors”); see also Mathies, 
350 F.2d at 967.  As Singh correctly notes, however, the 
jurisdiction in which he was convicted (the Second Circuit) 
interprets § 152(3) differently than we do.  Under the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation, “the words of the statute requiring 
that the testimony be given ‘knowingly and fraudulently’ 
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mean no more than an intentional untruth in a matter material 
to the issue which is itself material.”2  In re Robinson, 506 
F.2d 1184, 1187 (2d Cir. 1974) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In the Second Circuit, therefore, “only the basic 
requirements of perjury need to be proven.”3  Id. at 1189.  
Singh thus contends that the BIA erred in concluding that § 
152(3) “categorically involves fraud.”  Even if Singh is 
correct, however, it would not change the result here because 
the Second Circuit’s definition of § 152(3) necessarily 
requires deceit.  As noted in Kawashima, the word “deceit” 
refers to “the act or process of deceiving (as by falsification, 
concealment or cheating).”  132 S. Ct. at 1172.  The Second 
Circuit’s element of “knowingly” making a “false statement” 
fits this definition.4
                                              
2 The Second Circuit’s interpretation of § 152(3) is not 
necessarily at odds with the plain meaning of the word 
“fraudulently,” as the word “fraudulent” has at least two 
distinctly different meanings.  On one hand, a fraudulent 
statement is one that is “made . . . with the purpose or design 
to carry out a fraud.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (5th 
ed. 1979).  A statement is also fraudulent, however, if it is 
made with the simple intent to deceive.  See id. (“A 
statement, or claim, or document, is ‘fraudulent’ if it was 
falsely made, or caused to be made, with the intent to 
deceive.”).   
  Thus, irrespective of which statutory 
3 Consistent with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of § 
152(3), the sentencing court did not require that the 
government prove, nor did Singh admit to, an intent to 
defraud.   
4 The Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation in 
Kawashima.  There, the petitioner had been convicted of 
filing a false tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), which 
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elements we use, § 152(3) qualifies under subparagraph 
(M)(i) as an offense that involves deceit. 
 
B. Subparagraph (S) Considerations 
Singh also argues that because the Second Circuit 
considers § 152(3) to be “essentially equivalent to a perjury 
statute,” Robinson, 506 F.2d at 1189, he cannot be removable 
because his offense does not qualify under the INA’s 
provision for perjury-based aggravated felonies, 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(S) (hereinafter, “subparagraph (S)”).5
 
  Singh 
bases this position on Congress’s purported intent when 
enacting subparagraph (S) and the “basic rule” that “the 
specific statutory provision . . . should prevail over the more 
general.”  Appellant’s Br. at 23.  This argument is at odds 
with our precedent. 
As we made clear in Valansi, “[w]hen the statutory 
language [of the INA] has a clear meaning, we need not look 
further.”  278 F.3d at 214.  In Valansi, the petitioner argued 
that her conviction for embezzlement was a theft offense and 
                                                                                                     
established that the petitioner “knowingly and willfully 
submitted a tax return that was false as to a material matter.”  
Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172.  The Supreme Court 
concluded that the offense necessarily involved deceit, 
irrespective of whether the statute actually used the word 
“deceit.”  Id. 
5 Under subparagraph (S), perjury offenses only qualify as 
aggravated felonies if they result in a “term of imprisonment 
[of] at least one year.”  Singh does not qualify as an 
aggravated felon under subparagraph (S) because he only 
received a ten-month sentence. 
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could only be an aggravated felony if it satisfied the INA’s 
specific criteria for theft offenses under subparagraph (G).  Id. 
at 213.  We rejected this “all-or-nothing” argument because 
the “plain meaning of [subparagraph (M)(i)] suggests that 
embezzlement with intent to defraud would qualify as an 
offense that ‘involves fraud or deceit.’”  Id. at 214.  A similar 
situation applies here, as the plain meaning of subparagraph 
(M)(i) encompasses offenses, such as § 152(3), that involve 
knowingly making false statements.  Under Valansi we need 
not look further. 
  
C. The Loss Requirement  
We turn now to the issue of whether Singh’s offense 
was one in which the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000.  
Our determination depends in part on whether the 
government must prove actual loss, or merely an intended or 
potential loss.  We begin, therefore, by considering the 
meaning of subparagraph (M)(i)’s requirement that there be a 
“loss to the victim or victims.”  As we noted in granting 
Singh’s request to stay removal, the Second Circuit holds that 
subparagraph (M)(i) requires the loss to be an actual one.  See 
Pierre, 588 F.3d at 773 (citing Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 
105, 119 (2d Cir. 2001)).  For the reasons that follow, we 
agree with the Second Circuit. 
 
Since the INA does not define the term loss, we must 
interpret the word according to its ordinary meaning at the 
time Congress enacted subparagraph (M)(i).  See Robinson v. 
Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358, 365 (3d Cir. 2009) (“‘A 
fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless 
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning at the time 
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Congress enacted the statute.’” (quoting Perrin v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))).  Thus, because subparagraph 
(M)(i) was enacted by Congress in 1994,6
   
  we will consider 
the ordinary meaning of loss as of that time. 
The 1993 edition of Webster’s New International 
Dictionary provides numerous definitions of loss, along with 
illustrative examples.  Each of these definitions, and their 
corresponding examples, refer to loss that actually occurs.  
See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
1338 (1993).  Loss is defined, for example, as: (a) “the act or 
fact of losing”; (b) “a person or thing or an amount that is 
lost”; (c) “the act or fact of failing to gain, win, obtain, or 
utilize”; (d) a “decrease in amount, magnitude, or degree”; (e) 
“the state or fact of being destroyed or placed beyond 
recovery”; and (f) “the amount of an insured’s financial 
detriment due to the occurrence of a stipulated contingent 
event.”  Corresponding examples to illustrate these 
definitions include: (a) “loss of a leg”; (b) “killed, wounded, 
or captured soldiers”; (c) “loss of opportunity”; (d) “altitude 
loss”; (e) “loss of life in war”; and (f) financial detriment 
caused by “death, injury, destruction, or damage.”  
Importantly, not one of these definitions or examples refers to 
potential loss; even where loss refers to a failure to gain, the 
loss is characterized as having already occurred (e.g., loss of a 
battle). 
   
Consistent with Webster’s definition, this Court stated 
in 1991 that the “ordinary meaning” of loss is “actual loss,” 
not “probable” or “intended loss.”  United States v. Kopp, 951 
                                              
6 Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-406, 108 Stat. 4305 (1994). 
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F.2d 521, 529 (3d Cir. 1991) (superseded by statute on other 
grounds).  We conclude, therefore, that when Congress 
enacted subparagraph (M)(i), the plain meaning of loss 
referred to actual, not merely intended, loss.  Accordingly, 
because neither subparagraph (M)(i) nor paragraph (43) 
expand loss’s ordinary meaning, we hold that subparagraph 
(M)(i) requires actual loss.  Accord Kharana v. Gonzales, 487 
F.3d 1280, 1282 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]nterpreting § 
101(a)(43)(M)(i) such that a conviction involving an 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain more than $10,000 counts as a 
conviction ‘in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds 
$10,000’ flies in the face of the plain meaning of the 
statute.”). 
  
 Although some have argued that subparagraph (M)(i) 
should include intended loss, the reasons for overriding the 
statute’s plain meaning are unconvincing.  The concurrence in 
Kharana advanced the argument, for example, that because 
loss under subparagraph (U) has been interpreted to include 
intended loss, see Matter of S-I-K, 24 I. & N. Dec. 324 (BIA 
2007) and Matter of Onyido, 22 I. & N. Dec. 552 (BIA 1999), 
loss under subparagraph (M)(i) should be read to include 
intended loss as well.7
                                              
7 Because the government only charged Singh as removable 
under subparagraph (M)(i), we do not reach the question of 
whether intended loss satisfies the loss requirement for 
attempts or conspiracies to commit a deceit offense under 
subparagraph (U). 
  Kharana, 487 F.3d at 1286 (Wallace, 
J., concurring).  The Kharana concurrence reasons that 
because subparagraph (U) does not provide “additional gloss” 
on the word, loss’s meaning under (U) “applies with equal 
force” to subparagraph (M)(i).  Id.  There are several 
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problems with this argument.  Subparagraph (U) defines an 
aggravated felony as “an attempt or conspiracy to commit an 
offense described in this paragraph.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(U).  Since subparagraph (U) does not mention 
the word loss, it is hardly significant that (U) does not provide 
“additional gloss” on the word itself.  Further, we question 
the premise that subparagraph (U) does not provide any 
additional gloss.  After all, the reason the BIA interpreted 
subparagraph (U) to include intended loss is because (U) 
includes the word “attempt,” a word not present in (M).  See 
Onyido, 22 I. & N. at 553.  There is a clear textual reason, 
therefore, why loss under subparagraph (U) should not “apply 
with equal force” to subparagraph (M)(i).  Whereas 
subparagraph (U) expressly applies to attempts and 
conspiracies to commit crimes of deceit, subparagraph (M)(i) 
applies to consummated crimes of deceit.  The BIA 
determined that intended loss is relevant under subparagraph 
(U) because, by definition, an attempt to commit a crime does 
not require the crime to be successfully carried out.  See id.  
This rationale does not apply to completed offenses under 
subparagraph (M)(i).  In short, the fact that the BIA has held 
that actual loss is unnecessary under subparagraph (U), does 
not mean that actual loss must be unnecessary under (M)(i). 
 
Along with the Kharana concurrence, the Seventh 
Circuit has suggested, in dicta, that subparagraph (M)(i) 
should be interpreted to encompass intended loss.  See Eke v. 
Mukasey, 512 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2008).  The Seventh 
Circuit suggests that this interpretation would be reasonable 
because it is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines’ 
definition of loss for fraud and deceit crimes under U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1.  Id.  This argument is also unpersuasive.  The statutory 
language of subparagraph (M)(i) provides no indication that 
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Congress wanted loss to be defined in accordance with the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  As the Kharana concurrence 
observed, the Guidelines and the INA are like “apples and 
oranges.”  See Kharana, 487 F.3d at 1287 (Wallace, J., 
concurring).  Not only are they written by different bodies 
(one by a non-legislative commission, one by Congress), but 
they serve distinctly different purposes (one penological, one 
civil).8
 
  Although we have recognized that there might be 
occasions where the Guidelines can help “divine Congress’s 
intent when passing the INA,” no such guidance is necessary 
when the INA’s statutory language “has a clear meaning.”  
Valansi, 278 F.3d at 213–14.  Indeed, “[w]hen we find the 
terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, 
except in rare and exceptional circumstances.”  Rubin v. 
United States, 499 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (citations omitted).  
Here, there are no rare or exceptional circumstances that 
compel us to override subparagraph (M)(i)’s plain meaning. 
D. The Actual Loss from Singh’s Offense 
 Having determined that subparagraph (M)(i) requires 
actual loss, we now turn to the “specific circumstances” of 
Singh’s offense to determine if the government has proved by 
“clear and convincing” evidence that his offense involved an 
actual loss to a victim, or victims, that exceeds $10,000.  
Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302–03.  We begin by laying out the 
parameters of the circumstance-specific approach. 
                                              
8 It is instructive to note, for example, that the inclusion of 
intended loss in the Guidelines’ definition of loss was based 
on the Guidelines’ “overall theory of culpability for 
attempts.”  Kopp, 951 F.2d at 529 (emphasis added).   
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Although “not an invitation to relitigate the conviction 
itself,” Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 266, the circumstance-specific 
approach goes beyond the “modified-categorical approach” 
that is used for determining which elements of a disjunctive 
statute an individual was convicted of committing.  See 
Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302 (citing Shepard v. United States, 
544 U.S. 13 (2005) and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990)).  For example, whereas the modified-categorical 
approach is limited to the record of conviction (e.g., 
indictment, plea agreement, criminal judgment, etc) and 
judicial findings of fact, Alaka, 456 F.3d at 106, the 
circumstance-specific approach may consider “sentencing-
related material,” Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2302–03.  Accord 
Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 306 (BIA 2007).  
The guiding principle for the circumstance-specific analysis is 
that immigration courts must use “fundamentally fair 
procedures, including procedures that give an alien a fair 
opportunity to dispute a Government claim that a prior 
conviction involved a fraud with the relevant loss to victims.”  
Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2303. 
  
Here, the government argues that the circumstance-
specific approach proves the existence of a loss that exceeds 
$10,000.  The government’s primary argument is that, on its 
face, the restitution order is clear and convincing evidence of 
actual loss because restitution orders are limited to “actual 
losses that resulted from the offense of conviction.”  Gov’t 
Br. at 28.  The government also argues that the circumstances 
of the case prove that Singh caused an actual, if temporary, 
deprivation of $54,000 of assets to the bankruptcy trustee. 
   
1. The Restitution Order 
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According to the government, the very fact that the 
sentencing court issued a restitution order of $54,000 is proof 
positive that the requisite actual loss occurred.9   The 
government reaches this conclusion based on a misapplication 
of the federal statutes governing restitution orders by federal 
courts: the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 
U.S.C. § 3663A, and the Victim and Witness Protection Act 
(VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663.10
                                              
9 The BIA made this argument in its opinion as well.  
However, in contrast to the BIA (which devoted just one 
sentence to the issue), the government made this the 
centerpiece of its case.  Accordingly, we focus our analysis 
here on the government’s argument.   
  Under the MVRA, a federal 
sentencing court “shall order” restitution for certain offenses, 
but only if the court finds that “an identifiable victim or 
victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss” as a 
“direct[] and proximate[]” result of the offense.  §§ 
3663A(a)(2), (c)(1)(B).  Offenses involving “fraud or deceit” 
are included under the MVRA, § 3663A(c)(1)(A), and, as the 
government notes, violations of § 152(3) have “generally” 
10 As set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3556, “[t]he court, in imposing a 
sentence on a defendant who has been found guilty of an 
offense shall order restitution in accordance with section 
3663A [the MVRA], and may order restitution in accordance 
with section 3663 [the VWPA]. The procedures under section 
3664 shall apply to all orders of restitution under this 
section.”  Thus, if an offense qualifies under the MVRA, the 
sentencing court must order restitution.  Only if the offense 
does not qualify under the MVRA does a court have 
permissive authority to grant restitution under the VWPA.  
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qualified as such.11  Further, as the government points out, 
courts ordering restitution under the MVRA are limited to 
remedying the actual loss caused by the defendant’s “offense 
of conviction.”  Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 
(1990).12
 
  Ergo, the government concludes that the sentencing 
court’s restitution order of $54,000 here is ipso facto evidence 
that Singh caused an actual loss to a victim exceeding 
$10,000. 
The government’s argument fails, however, for three 
reasons.  First, its reliance on the MVRA is misplaced 
because the record shows that the sentencing court issued 
restitution pursuant to an express agreement by the parties, 
not the MVRA.  Second, the law governing restitution issued 
pursuant to a party agreement shows that such orders are not 
limited to actual losses from the offense of conviction.  Third, 
even if the court’s restitution order reflected a judicial finding 
of loss, Nijhawan and our own precedent make clear that we 
                                              
11 Gov’t Br. at 27–28 (citing Feldman, 338 F.3d at 219–20; 
United States v. Waldner, 580 F.3d 699, 709–10 (8th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Lovell, 256 F.3d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 
2001); United States v. Grice, 419 Fed. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 
2011) (unpublished)).  
12 Although Hughey was decided before the MVRA was 
enacted, the Second Circuit (the circuit in which Singh was 
convicted) has applied Hughey’s interpretation of the VWPA 
to the MVRA.  See United States v. Marino, 654 F.3d 310, 
319 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Local # 46 Metallic 
Lathers Union, 568 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2009) and United 
States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
Other federal circuits do so as well.  E.g., United States v. 
Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 661 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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need not take the order at face value for removal purposes, 
particularly when, as here, it conflicts with undisputed facts in 
the sentencing material.  We will address each of these three 
reasons in turn. 
  
First, the government’s reliance on the MVRA is 
misplaced because it is doubtful the sentencing court issued 
restitution under the MVRA.  The sentencing court was only 
required to issue restitution under the MVRA if, and only if, 
the court determined that Singh’s offense caused “a physical 
injury or pecuniary loss” to a “victim.”  § 3663A(c).  This is 
significant because it is unlikely that the bankruptcy trustee 
here actually qualified as a victim under the MVRA.  
Although the government cites United States v. Holthaus, 486 
F.3d 451, 457–58 (8th Cir. 2007), for the proposition that 
bankruptcy trustees can be victims of § 152(3) violations, it 
omits the fact that Holthaus limited this holding to trustees 
whose “compensation” has been “negatively impacted.”  Id. 
(adopting rule set forth by the Seventh Circuit in United 
States v. Lowell, 256 F.3d 463, 465–66 (7th Cir. 2001)); see 
also United States v. Paradis, 219 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(holding that trustee is not a victim of bankruptcy fraud under 
MVRA where defendant concealed funds that would go to the 
creditors).  Here, the government agreed at sentencing that the 
trustee “did not expend any substantial additional resources as 
a result of the defendant’s fraud.”  App. at 298–99.  It is 
unlikely, therefore, that the sentencing court determined the 
trustee to be a victim with an actual loss under the MVRA, 
particularly since there is nothing in the record of conviction 
indicating it deliberated on this otherwise novel ruling. 
  
Another factor suggesting that the MVRA was not the 
statutory framework for the restitution order is the fact that 
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the court expressly stated that it issued the order “pursuant to 
[the] plea agreement.”  App. at 195.  This suggests the order 
was issued under § 3663(a)(3) of the VWPA, since that 
provision allows sentencing courts to order restitution “in any 
criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea 
agreement.”  § 3663(a)(3) (emphasis added).  Supporting this 
view is the fact that the sentencing court does not appear to 
have demonstrated its consideration of the statutory factors 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), as courts in the Second Circuit are 
required to do when issuing restitution in the absence of an 
agreement.  See United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 232–33 
(2d Cir. 1996).  Accordingly, we do not agree with the 
government’s argument that the sentencing court was 
required to, or did in fact, issue restitution pursuant to the 
MVRA.13
 
  
 Second, the fact that the sentencing court issued its 
order “pursuant to [the] plea agreement” is significant 
because, in the Second Circuit, restitution is not limited to 
actual loss caused by the offense of conviction when issued 
pursuant to an agreement.  United States v. Silkowski, 32 F.3d 
682, 688–89 (2d Cir. 1994).  This Court and several other 
courts of appeals have recognized this prevailing rule.  United 
States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 140 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(“Restitution is limited to amounts ‘directly caused by the 
conduct composing the offense of conviction,’ or those 
amounts that defendant ‘expressly agree[s] to’ pursuant to the 
                                              
13 The restitution provision in the plea agreement references 
both “18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A.”  App. at 225.  This 
suggests that the parties either (a) did not determine which 
statute applied to their agreement, or (b) deferred to the 
court’s determination.     
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plea agreement.” (quoting Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 689)); United 
States v. Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (4th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Schrimsher, 58 F.3d 610, 611 (11th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 533 (9th 
Cir. 1992).  The government is thus incorrect when it asserts 
that “[u]nder either the MVRA or the VWPA, the restitution 
award can encompass only actual losses that resulted from the 
offense of conviction.”  Gov’t Br. at 28 (citing Hughey, 495 
U.S. at 420; United States v. Zakhary, 357 F.3d 186, 190–91 
(2d Cir. 2004); Feldman, 338 F.3d at 220; United States v. 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 942 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Importantly, 
all of the cases the government cites to support its position are 
cases where the court ordered restitution in the absence of an 
agreement by the parties.14
 
  See Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413–15; 
Zakhary, 357 F.3d at 188–89; Feldman, 338 F.3d at 214–15; 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 930.  Accordingly, because the 
sentencing court ordered restitution pursuant to Singh’s 
express agreement, the government’s argument is based on 
inapposite law. 
 Third, to the extent that the restitution order reflects 
the sentencing court’s determination of actual loss, Nijhawan 
and our precedent make clear that immigration courts are not 
bound to accept this determination at face value.  Under 
                                              
14 The BIA made the same error.  In its opinion, it cites 
United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2001), for 
the proposition that “a court’s power to order restitution is 
limited to actual loss.”  App. at 4.  As with the cases cited by 
the government, the sentencing court in Diaz did not issue the 
restitution order pursuant to the parties’ express agreement.  
See Diaz, 245 F.3d at 296. 
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Nijhawan, a restitution order must be assessed in the context 
of “conflicting evidence.”  129 S. Ct. at 2303.  Since the 
petitioner in Nijhawan did not point to “any” conflicting 
evidence, the Court ruled that a restitution order for $683 
million coupled with the defendant’s stipulation that his 
offense caused more than $100 million in loss was sufficient 
to meet the government’s burden.  Id. at 2298, 2303.  
Consistent with Nijhawan, we have taken the position that a 
restitution order “may be helpful” to the loss inquiry, but is 
not definitive.  Munroe v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 225, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  In Munroe, the sentencing court issued an 
amended restitution order of $9,999 in a thinly veiled attempt 
“to alter the effect of the conviction for immigration 
purposes.”  Id. at 226–27.  Because we found it “abundantly 
clear” from the record (e.g., the indictment, guilty plea, and 
initial restitution order) that the defendant’s offense caused a 
loss exceeding $10,000, we refused to let the amended 
restitution order be controlling.  Id.  As with Munroe, the 
circumstances here—which we discuss below—make it 
“abundantly clear” that the restitution in the court’s amended 
judgment does not reflect the actual loss resulting from 
Singh’s offense.  In other words, there is sufficient 
“conflicting evidence” to justify looking past the restitution 
order. 
    
 Despite Nijhawan and Munroe, the government 
contends that Singh is collaterally estopped from challenging 
the validity of the order.  The government bases this argument 
on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Patel v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 
800 (5th Cir. 2008).  Patel, however, was decided before 
Nijhawan, and its current viability appears tenuous to us.  In 
Nijhawan, the Court stated that petitioners, including those 
challenging restitution orders, “have at least one and possibly 
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two opportunities to contest the amount of loss, the first at the 
earlier sentencing and the second at the deportation hearing 
itself.”  129 S. Ct. at 2303.  Further, the Nijhawan Court sided 
with the government, not because the petitioner was estopped 
from challenging his restitution order, but because he failed to 
point to sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon it.  See id.  
Unlike the petitioner in Nijhawan, the petitioner here has 
pointed to undisputed facts in the sentencing material that 
undermine the restitution order’s reliability as a measure of 
actual loss.15
   
  We will now discuss this evidence. 
2. Specific Offense Circumstances 
At the time Singh committed his offense of conviction 
(i.e., knowingly making a false statement in relation to 
Raeback’s bankruptcy petition), the money that he failed to 
disclose was in the custody of the Port Authority and beyond 
his control.  While Singh may have subjectively believed his 
criminal act would enable him to obtain this money, in reality 
this was just as impossible as the failed attempt in Onyido, 
                                              
15 This applies to the restitution agreement as well.  Although 
this Court has previously stated that an amount agreed to in a 
plea agreement provides the definitive measure of loss, we 
did so in the context of a modified-categorical analysis.  See 
Alaka, 456 F.3d at 108; see also Nijhawan v. Att’y Gen., 523 
F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Alaka for proposition that 
where defendant pleads to a specific loss amount, “that 
amount is controlling”).  Since the Supreme Court has 
rejected using the modified-categorical approach for 
determining loss under subparagraph (M)(i), Nijhawan, 129 
S. Ct. at 2302–03, the Alaka rule does not limit our inquiry 
here.   
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where the BIA accepted that the loss was only intended, not 
actual.  See 22 I. & N. Dec. 552.  In Onyido, the DHS sought 
to remove the petitioner based on his conviction for filing a 
false claim with the intent to defraud an insurance company.  
Id. at 553.  Onyido was convicted for signing paperwork to 
process a fraudulent $15,000 claim in the presence of people 
he believed were insurance agents, but were in fact 
undercover officers.  Id.  Although the facts are somewhat 
more complicated here, we find them to be functionally 
equivalent to Onyido.  For starters, both cases involve 
situations where, at the moment the crime was consummated, 
a government sting operation made any intended benefit 
impossible.  Since the Port Authority had custody of the 
funds, basic principles of property law precluded Singh from 
having any capacity to use this money for his benefit.16
                                              
16 Based on the facts in the record, Singh would have had no 
means for obtaining the $54,000 from the Port Authority (the 
defrauded party) for his personal benefit because a 
wrongdoer’s interest in fraudulently obtained property is 
voidable, In re Newpower, 233 F.3d 922, 929 (6th Cir. 2000); 
S.E.C. v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1176 (2d Cir. 1989), and 
subject to a constructive trust, see In re Am. Motor Club, Inc., 
109 B.R. 595, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).  Although the Port 
Authority transferred the money to the trustee, this was not 
for the benefit of Singh.  Instead, under the unique rules of 
bankruptcy, a debtor’s estate is deemed to include 
fraudulently obtained property, so long as the property was 
not impressed with a constructive trust prior to the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding.  See generally 
In re Omegas Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994).  The 
inclusion of fraudulently obtained property in the debtor’s 
estate is not for the debtor’s benefit.  Id. at 1452; see also In 
  The 
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fact that Singh “agreed” to have this money transferred to the 
trustee as restitution was thus only a formality—one in which 
he had nothing to lose, but potentially much to gain.17
 
  
The impossibility of Singh’s intended18
                                                                                                     
re Quality Holstein Leasing, 752 F.2d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 
1985).  It is designed, instead, to ensure equal treatment of 
creditors, each of whom “has suffered disappointed 
expectations at the hands of the debtor.”  Omegas Group, 16 
F.3d at 1452.   
 outcome does 
not end our inquiry, however, because it is obviously possible 
that Singh’s offense could have still caused actual losses.  It is 
conceivable, for example, that Singh’s offense could have 
produced incidental losses for the bankruptcy trustee by 
forcing him to spend additional money and time accessing the 
17 Singh stood to gain because the restitution agreement 
increased his chances of getting a non-incarceratory sentence, 
which was his “fervent” objective.  App. at 264.  Singh was 
well aware of this during the sentencing proceedings as he 
cited the restitution agreement as a factor that “strongly 
favors a non-incarceratory” sentence.  App. at 292.   
18 It bears noting that Singh was only convicted of having an 
intent to deceive, not an intent to defraud.  It is possible, 
therefore, that Singh’s intent may have been based on other 
considerations besides defrauding the estate; for example, 
preventing detection of his illicit business arrangement with 
U.S. Rebar.  While this distinction may have a bearing on the 
tethering analysis, see Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 118 n.12, 
we need not decide the issue here because there is no actual 
loss to tether.  See generally Alaka, 456 F.3d at 106–08 
(describing requirement that loss be tethered to actual offense 
of conviction, not general or acquitted conduct).  
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$54,000.  The record, however, does not demonstrate any 
such loss.  Indeed, as the U.S. Attorney conceded in the 
sentencing memorandum, the trustee “did not expend any 
substantial additional resources as a result of the defendant’s 
fraud.”  App at 298–99.  Thus, under the metric that federal 
courts of appeals have used for determining if bankruptcy 
trustees have suffered pecuniary harm, Holthaus, 486 F.3d at 
457–58; Lowell, 256 F.3d at 465–66; Paradis, 219 F.3d at 25, 
the trustee in this case suffered no identifiable loss. 
   
It is also conceivable that Singh’s offense may have 
resulted in actual losses for the creditors.  Had the Port 
Authority, for example, not learned of Singh’s bankruptcy 
proceedings, the trustee may never have learned about the 
$54,000, and, consequently, the creditors could have had a 
smaller estate from which to recover on their claims.  Again, 
however, the record shows that this potential loss did not 
actually occur, since the Port Authority transferred the funds 
to the trustee prior to the distribution of Raeback’s assets.  As 
noted in the U.S. Attorney’s sentencing memorandum, “the 
bankruptcy trustee will receive the funds which the defendant 
attempted to secrete,” and thus, “the defendant’s crime will 
not affect the ultimate outcome of the bankruptcy 
proceedings.”  App. at 298 (emphases added). 
    
Although Singh’s offense did not deprive the creditors 
of assets, the government argues that Singh’s offense caused 
an actual loss by depriving the trustee.  To support this 
argument, the government contrasts this case with the 
intended loss at issue in Pierre, where the petitioner was 
convicted of bank fraud for submitting fraudulent documents 
to obtain a $500,000 loan from a bank.  588 F.3d at 770.  As 
the government notes, the bank in Pierre detected the fraud 
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before loaning any money, and was thus never deprived of 
any property for any period of time.  By contrast, the 
government argues that Singh’s offense deprived the trustee 
of $54,000 from Raeback’s estate.19
   
  What the government 
omits, however, is that the trustee, unlike the bank in Pierre, 
was not a party that stood to lose from the deprivation itself 
(as compared to the incidental effects thereof).  Instead, the 
only people who stood to lose were Raeback’s creditors, and 
thus the deprivation should be assessed against them, not the 
trustee.  Accordingly, because the creditors were not deprived 
of any property for any length of time, the fact that the trustee 
was temporarily unable to access all of Raeback’s assets does 
not constitute an actual loss to an actual victim. 
While the government is correct that the creditors may 
have suffered a loss if Singh was never caught, the same is 
equally true for the potential victim in Pierre.  Indeed, the 
government’s argument that Singh should not benefit from 
the fortuitous fact that he was caught before his creditors 
were harmed overlooks the reality that such fortuitous facts 
are inherent to all intended loss.  While an intended loss may 
                                              
19 The government supports this result by applying the test we 
established in United States v. Feldman, 338 F.3d 212 (3d 
Cir. 2003) for calculating actual loss for restitution purposes.  
Under Feldman, actual loss is measured by comparing “what 
actually happened with what would have happened if [the 
defendant] had acted lawfully.”  338 F.3d at 221.  We need 
not address Feldman here, however, because even if we 
assume it is appropriate in the removal context, it would not 
change the result in this case for the reasons stated above. 
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itself provide grounds for removal,20
  
 we are bound here to 
follow the statutory language of subparagraph (M)(i), which 
requires actual loss. 
Finally, we wish to make clear that our conclusion 
does not mean, as the government contends, that an alien 
defendant can avoid a finding of actual loss for removal 
purposes simply by paying restitution after getting caught.  
Indeed, we agree with the government that payment of 
restitution should not, and does not, negate a loss that actually 
occurred.  Our holding here is a narrow one, involving an 
offense that at no point resulted in an actual loss to any victim 
for any length of time.  To highlight the narrowness of this 
rule, consider the result in a situation like Pierre had the bank 
not detected the fraud.  If a bank gives a person a loan under 
false pretenses, then no matter how soon afterwards it detects 
the fraud, whether one minute or one year, an actual loss 
results because the person obtains possession of the loan at 
the direct deprivation of the bank.  It doesn’t matter how 
fleetingly the person obtains control.  If the person’s offense 
deprives the defrauded party of property, an actual loss occurs 
to an actual victim under subparagraph (M)(i). 
 
Contrary to the government’s suggestion at oral 
argument, therefore, nothing in this opinion will change the 
result in Nijhawan and other cases where restitution was paid 
after the petitioner’s offense caused an actual loss.  In 
Nijhawan, the petitioner was convicted of a fraudulent 
scheme that deceived banks into giving over $100 million 
                                              
20 As noted earlier, we need not decide today whether 
intended loss satisfies the loss requirement for deceit offenses 
charged under subparagraph (U).  See supra note 7. 
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dollars to the petitioner and his co-defendants.  523 F.3d 387, 
389 (3d Cir. 2008).  Unlike the situation here, there was no 
government sting operation that doomed the scheme from its 
inception, the petitioner obtained control of the money, and 
the victims that stood to directly lose from being deprived of 
the money (i.e., the banks) were in fact deprived.   
Irrespective, therefore, of whether the petitioner in Nijhawan 
paid full restitution for his crime, nothing in this opinion 
would change the outcome of that case, nor others like it. 
   
In summary, the undisputed circumstances of this case 
show that a government sting operation (a) doomed any 
intended benefit when the crime was committed, and (b) 
prevented any potential or incidental losses from in fact 
occurring.  This observation is the same whether we focus our 
inquiry at the time the court ordered restitution; at the time 
Singh was charged; or, as, the government implores us, at the 
time Singh committed the offense.  At any of these times, the 
record shows that: (a) a government entity (the Port 
Authority) had custody of the money; (b) Singh had no 
capacity to obtain this money for his personal benefit; (c) the 
trustee’s personal compensation had not been affected; and 
(d) the creditors had not been deprived of any property for 
any length of time.  Under this set of circumstances, we find 
that no actual loss occurred.  
  
E. Additional Considerations 
 Since the government has failed to provide clear and 
convincing evidence that Singh’s offense caused an actual 
loss exceeding $10,000,  Singh is not removable under 
subparagraph (M)(i).  Although it is possible that Singh may 
be removable under subparagraph (U), the DHS only charged 
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him under (M).  This is important because Singh has a due 
process right to receive notice of “[t]he charges against [him] 
and the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1229(a); see also United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 
92, 104 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that, under the Constitution, 
aliens have right to receive “notice of the charges” against 
them and a “fair opportunity to be heard”).  Further, since 
removability under (U) would involve questions that neither 
Singh nor this Court have had an opportunity to address, it 
appears that a sua sponte invocation of (U) at this late stage in 
the litigation would prejudice Singh’s rights.  See Pierre, 588 
F.3d at 776–77 (holding that BIA’s sua sponte invocation of 
subparagraph (U) as basis for removal violated petitioner’s 
due process rights); see also Ming Lam Sui, 250 F.3d at 113–
19 (addressing questions unique to a removability analysis 
under subparagraph (U)).  Our inquiry here, therefore, is at its 
end.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Singh’s 
petition for review and vacate the BIA’s order of removal. 
